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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the intrinsic and instrumental value of governance and social norms 
to the well being of New Zealanders. The interaction between informal social norms and 
formal institutions is also discussed. An attempt is made to identify the channels and 
precise mechanisms through which governance and social norms respectively may impact 
on well-being. Empirical evidence on these effects is cited, and the relevance of the 
evidence to New Zealand is assessed. A range of suggestions is then presented for 
strengthening the governance of public institutions in New Zealand, focusing on 
improvements to transparency, accountability and integrity within existing constitutional 
arrangements. Finally, some tentative remarks are made on the potential role of 
government in influencing the evolution of social norms, and managing tensions between 
conflicting norms in New Zealand. 
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Institutions, Social Norms and  
Well-being 
1 Introduction   
This paper considers in detail a component of social capability that is suggested by the 
Treasury’s Inclusive Economy framework
1
 as being centrally important to the well-being of 
New Zealanders: the functioning of the public institutions that provide the broad 
environment within which politics, society and the economy operate. Related to this is the 
role of the informal “institutions” of social norms in contributing to social cohesion and 
well-being, and in facilitating the functioning of formal institutions.  
The Inclusive Economy framework is based on analysing the complex inter-relationships 


















                                                                 
1 See Treasury (2001). 
2 Taken from Treasury (2001), p. 4. 







1.1.  Well-being  
arising from consumption of 
goods and services, family, 
health, job, security, 
community, freedoms and 
opportunities 
1.1.  Productive 
capability  
arising from 
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The term social capability is defined here as a society’s capacity for collective action in a 
variety of spheres, including non-market and market, and involving voluntary interactions 
as well as the use of the coercive powers of the state. 
3
 In this broad sense social 
capability subsumes the notion of social cohesion – a more cohesive society will, in 
general, have a higher level of social capability. For example, it will be able to support a 
wider range of market exchanges and non-market interactions and institutions. 
The perspective adopted in the paper is one in which social norms and formal state 
institutions can both substitute for and complement each other. The paper draws on 
agency theory, on the literature on social capital, on social norm theory, and on the 
concept of a national integrity system.  
The paper attempts to identify the ways in which governance and social norms may 
impact on well-being, and to assess the relevance of these issues to New Zealand. A 
number of areas are then suggested where the governance of public institutions can be 
strengthened in this country. 
4
 This last discussion takes as given the fundamental 
elements of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, and focuses on improvements to 
the transparency, accountability and integrity of public institutions. The paper also 
contains some tentative remarks about the potential role of government in New Zealand in 
influencing the evolution of social norms. 
The structure of the paper is as follows; section 2 presents a short discussion of the 
intrinsic and instrumental value of good governance.  Section 3 discusses the contribution 
of social norms to well-being, and considers some of the interactions between social 
norms and formal institutions.  Section 4 presents the specific direct and indirect channels 
through which governance and social norms, respectively, may affect well-being, cites 
evidence for those effects, and discusses the relevance of the evidence to New Zealand.  
Section 5 identifies a number of areas where the governance of public institutions can be 
strengthened in New Zealand, and contains some tentative remarks about the potential 
role of government in influencing the evolution of social norms.  Section 6 contains some 
concluding comments. 
2  The Intrinsic and Instrumental Value of 
Good Governance 
Governance is generally defined as the formal and informal ways in which power and 
authority are exercised within a given entity (e.g. organisation, firm, or country). It is a 
multi-faceted concept, and the precise usage of the term varies considerably.  Applied at 
the national level, it encompasses the constitutional structure, the operation of political 
and judicial processes, and public management. Important components of governance 
include relations between the state and the individual citizen, the state and civil society, 
and the state and markets. 
On one view, the quality of governance at the national level is determined by the impact of 
the exercise of power on the quality of life of its citizens – an instrumental approach in 
which the test of governance is the outcomes that collective state actions help to bring 
                                                                 
3 This use of the term contrasts with recent usage by some within the social capital literature to refer to that 
sub-set of social relations (or social capital) that involve only the formal institutions of the State (e.g. Woolcock, 
2001). For a description of social capital theory and its relevance to public policy in New Zealand, see Petrie 
(2000).  
4
 A separate paper considers in detail issues in Maori governance and Maori society that are little 
more than touched on in this paper. See Greenland (undated).  
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about. In another view, governance involves, in addition to the above, elements that are 
held to be important ends in themselves, such as individual freedoms of various kinds. 
A recent influential exposition of the latter approach is by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, in 
his book Development as Freedom. Sen (1999) asserts that freedom is central to the 
process of development because it is intrinsically important, and because, in its various 
dimensions and the interconnections between them, freedom is critically dependent on the 
“free agency of people.” Sen uses the term “agency” not in the sense of a principal/agent 
relationship, but to mean individuals acting and bringing about change whose 
achievements can be judged in terms of their own values and objectives.  
For Sen, long-asked questions such as “are political and civil liberties conducive to 
development?” are misconceived. They constrain “development” to a narrow focus on 
material output. Such liberties should be seen as ends in themselves, not requiring any 
further justification on the basis of their instrumental effects on other outcomes, such as 
economic growth. Similarly, Sen argues – in the tradition of Adam Smith – that exchange 
of goods in markets has a prior justification in terms of an intrinsically important freedom 
to exchange. 
Sen makes the further assertion, however, that such freedoms are also critically important 
to the achievement of social development, in the form of economic growth and 
improvements in the quality of life. He assembles empirical evidence on the connections 
between freedoms of various kinds, and a variety of social outcomes. Some of the 
evidence is drawn from developed countries, and Sen argues his framework is relevant to 
the issues confronting rich countries as well as poor countries. 
Sen identifies five different freedoms: 
1) Political freedoms – democratic systems with freedom of expression and 
organisation, and a free media. 
2)  Economic facilities – the opportunities that individuals enjoy to utilize economic 
resources for consumption, production or exchange. These depend on initial 
endowments and the conditions of exchange (including the functioning of 
markets).  
3)  Social opportunities – social arrangements for education, health care and so on 
which influence individuals’ substantive freedom to live better lives. 
4)  Transparency guarantees – social interactions operate on some basic 
presumption of trust. The freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of 
disclosure and lucidity is important to preventing corruption and other underhand 
dealings. 
5)  Protective security – a social safety net for the poor and vulnerable, comprising 
on-going institutions and ad hoc emergency measures. 
Sen focuses on the empirical connections that link freedoms of different kinds.  
“Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help to promote 
economic security. Social opportunities (in the form of education and health 
facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities (in the form of 
opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to generate personal 
abundance as well as public resources for social facilities. Freedoms of different 
kinds can strengthen one another.” (Sen, 1999, p.11). 
Sen rejects any claim that this concept of development is a narrowly Western democratic 
one, and cites a history of non-Western thought in support of his argument.  
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In this paper the focus is on those elements of Sen’s five freedoms that are directly 
relevant to the governance of public institutions and the evolution of social norms. They 
are political freedoms, economic facilities, and transparency guarantees. The specific 
channels through which these freedoms may impact on well-being are identified in Section 
4, together with references to supporting evidence.  
In the next section the relationship between social norms, social cohesion and formal 
government institutions is considered. 
3  Social Norms and Government Institutions 
3.1 Social  Norms 
Social norms can be defined as informal “rules of the game” that regulate social 
interactions, thereby reducing transaction costs.
5
 They are based on shared 
understandings amongst members of a group about actions that are desirable, merely 
permitted, or actively discouraged.  
Norms can be society-wide or held by sub-groups – and, depending on the perspective 
adopted, can be positive or negative for well-being. 
Social norms are sometimes seen as one amongst a larger set of mechanisms of social 
control (after Ellickson, 1991). Other forms of social control are economic incentives, 
customary law, and coercion through means of formal state institutions.  
  Fukuyama (2000a) has characterised social norms as originating in one of two 
intersecting dimensions: the first is along a hierarchical (e.g. organised religion) or 
spontaneous (e.g. arising from interactions in markets) dimension. The second is along a 
rational (e.g. common law) or a-rational (e.g. biologically grounded) dimension.  
Norms often have a basis in shared cultural, religious or moral beliefs or practices that act 
to coordinate the expectations of individuals about the basis on which social interactions 
will occur. Norms are also often established by a dominant group as a means of 
promoting a pattern of behaviour that serves their interests. 
Social norms are enforced by informal rewards and sanctions, and gain status through 
adherence over time. Sanctions may be self-imposed – as in the case of guilt felt by an 
individual who violates a norm to which they personally subscribe – or they may be 
imposed by members of a social group – as when an individual is shamed as a result of 
being seen by other group members to have violated an established norm. A further 
possible form of sanction is the imposition of a punishment on those who observe but do 
not themselves punish an infraction of an accepted norm (what Axelrod (1986) has termed 
a meta-norm).  
In economic terms, social norms are one class of solutions to collective action problems. 
Because of their dependence on individuals’ willingness to incur the cost of imposing 
sanctions on non-compliers, however, social norms are themselves subject to collective 
action problems. That is, monitoring others’ behaviour and imposing sanctions involves 
personal costs, while the benefits are shared by all members of the group. This is a form 
of public good. It suggests that social norms will be more effective in small, close-knit 
groups where members have ready information on past and current actions of others in 
the group, and the ability to impose low-cost informal sanctions such as shame and 
reputational damage through means such as gossip. 
                                                                 
5 The discussion of social norms in this section draws on Axelrod (1986), Ellickson (1991), Coleman (1991), 
Palmer (1993), Sunstein (1996), and Ostrom (2000).  
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Nevertheless, a considerable body of experimental evidence exists of behavioural 
regularities that suggest a willingness of people to cooperate in situations where their 
narrow self-interest would indicate that non-cooperation is rational. On this basis, and 
after in-depth empirical study of informal cooperation in the management of local common 
pool resources in a number of countries, Ostrom (2000) argues that a deep-seated norm 
of reciprocity exists across many societies. She defines reciprocity to mean that, in 
response to friendly actions people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative 
than predicted by the rational self-interest model; and conversely, that in response to 
hostile actions they are nastier than might be predicted.   
Ostrom argues that the norm of reciprocity (or conditional cooperation) is a fairly stable 
behavioural response exhibited by a portion of the population that can be relied on under 
certain circumstances. Citing extensive empirical evidence – for example, of small-scale 
irrigation schemes - she has put forward a number of design principles that contribute to 
successful self-organized local resource management regimes that regulate their activities 
through informal social norms. These include the presence of clear boundary rules 
defining who has rights to draw on the resource.  The users of the resource design their 
own rules governing use of the resource. Individuals are more wiling to abide by rules 
where they have participated in their design, which means they are more likely to reflect 
shared concepts of fairness. Where rules on resource distribution are made by 
government agencies there is a lower level of compliance with the rules.  That 
enforcement of the rules is by local users or people accountable to them.  Recognition of 
the right to organise by a government authority, which helps the group to enforce the 
informal rules it creates and avoids the need to rely on unanimity as the decision rule.  For 
larger resources (for example, a major irrigation water source), the presence of 
governance activities organized in multiple layers, each with its own distinct set of rules 
appropriate to the particular scale of activity concerned. 
3.2  Norms and Institutions 
Social norms are most commonly contrasted with the formal institutions of the State, 
which are created in a centralized, deliberate manner, and which act to coordinate 
expectations through the use of coercive powers imposed by a common third party. The 
limits on the effectiveness of social norms – in terms of the complexity and scale of 
interactions they can regulate – have been suggested as a reason for the existence of 
government. Nevertheless, social norms retain an important role in advanced societies.  
Of most interest in the current context are the interactions between social norms and the 
effectiveness of formal government institutions. 
6
 
Social norms and formal state institutions interact in a variety of ways. 
7
 For instance, 
informal social norms might pre-date formal laws, but, once they are widely observed, 
may be reflected in and reinforced through formal codification in law. A law supports a 
norm through supplementing private enforcement with the formal enforcement 
mechanisms of the state. The law may also add credibility to a norm by signalling the 
seriousness with which society views an issue. The presence of an effective legal 
framework means that less reliance needs to be placed on informal social norms and 
generalised inter-personal trust (a scarce commodity) to “enforce” agreements. 
On the other hand, laws ultimately require support from social norms if they are to be 
effective. This is the fundamental explanation for the failure of the “rule of law” in many 
countries where the formal laws are not at all observed in practice. Social norms play a 
role in generating and sustaining commitment to a society’s institutional structures – in 
                                                                 
6 Other applications include the role of social norms within firms in motivating employees. See Coleman (1991) 
and Fehr and Gachter (2000). 
7 The following discussion draws heavily on Axelrod (1986).  
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other words, norms play an important role in building social cohesion. 
8
 For example 
Norms may proscribe anti-social activity, such as crime and the avoidance of social and 
citizen responsibilities (e.g. tax evasion, abuse of the benefit system).   Norms may foster 
a sense of responsibility amongst individuals for their own future, and for the impacts of 
their actions on others, particularly in their families and local communities. 
9
  Norms of 
fairness and reciprocity act to coordinate expectations, and to limit the scope for conflict.   
A norm of generalised interpersonal trust can act to create a willingness to give people 
some “benefit of the doubt” in social, political and economic interactions when those 
people are neither directly known nor known through mutual acquaintance.  
The law typically defines expected behaviour with greater clarity than an informal norm. 
However, while a law may add clarity to a norm over the domain covered by the law, this 
clarity may be gained at the cost of suggesting that conformity with the law is the limit of 
one’s social obligations. Externally imposed laws may undermine the emergence or 
viability of informal social norms, especially where there is weak enforcement of the law. 
Ostrom (2000) has also argued that there is evidence that norms have a certain staying 
power in encouraging the growth of the desire for cooperative behaviour over time, 
whereas cooperation enforced by externally imposed rules can disappear very quickly. 
Laws and norms may be mutually self-supporting because they have complementary 
strengths and weaknesses. Social norms are often best at preventing numerous small 
infractions where the cost of enforcement is low. Laws often function best to prevent 
infrequent but serious infractions where the cost of enforcement is high.  
The law may provide the backdrop against which individuals negotiate bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements, in the manner envisaged by Coase (1960). On the other hand, 
in some situations the formal legal situation may be unknown or misperceived by 
individuals, who nevertheless develop informal social norms to regulate behaviour. 
10
 
Customary law represents a hybrid between informal social norms and formal, state-
supplied law. 
11
 In a number of countries customary law governs much of everyday social 
and commercial life, especially in rural communities. It is often imposed through 
formalised processes – and may be recognised in Statute law. In New Zealand, Maori 
customary law has force in some spheres, such as land ownership and adoption. 
The common law also represents a hybrid between state-supplied law, and informal, 
decentralised social norms. The common law is not codified, can transcend national 
boundaries, evolves over time and has its foundations in customary practices. For 
instance, courts may look to informal business customs to flesh out incomplete contracts. 
Government institutions may play a role in the evolution of fairness norms. Gorringe 
(1995) has suggested that the actions of public institutions can improve “framing effects” 




                                                                 
8 Treasury (1994) defined social cohesion as the “willing and sustainable commitment of the members of a 
society to its institutional structures.” 
9 “Together with opportunity, this condition provides the basic foundation for mutual gain which keeps a society 
together.” (Treasury, 1994, p. 5). 
10 For instance, Ellickson (1991) found in a detailed study of the arrangements amongst cattle farmers to 
regulate disputes arising from the damage due to escaped cattle, that the formal laws were irrelevant, and that 
the farmers governed themselves by means of informal social norms. 
11 I am grateful to David Robinson for this point. The discussion in this paragraph draws on Klingelhofer and 
Robinson (2001). 
12 See Gorringe (1995), in Grimes et al (2001), pp. 54-55. By framing effects Gorringe refers to experimental 
evidence that people’s perceptions of fairness depend on (are framed by) the context in which the situation or 
consideration is presented. For instance, people in experiments are less likely to share money when they have  
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A good enabling environment for civil society (e.g. civil liberties) creates the space for 
social bonds to be created in the non-government sector. For example, voluntary 
membership of like-minded individuals in groups working together for common ends 
assists the evolution and maintenance of social norms. In turn, an effective civil society – 
such as an active media, and well-informed Non-Government Organisations - can 
generate pressure for more effective and accountable government. 
An effective legal framework establishing property rights and supporting the functioning of 
markets facilitates voluntary economic exchanges, thereby contributing to the 
development of norms such as fair dealing and trust. 
Constitutional conventions, such as the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, can be 
viewed as social norms that guide the legitimate use of coercive power by government. 
They represent an important check on the potential abuse of power by the executive. 
13
 
3.3  The Span of Norms 
An important dimension of social norms is the extent to which they span sub-groups in 
society. Inter-group relations might be extensive, and be based on a high level of shared 
norms and values. Alternatively, there may be limited interaction between different sub-
groups, and a relatively low level of shared norms and values.
14
 In the latter case, 
cohesion would presumably require that the norm of tolerance of diversity at least should 
be widely shared.  
This in turn leads to recognition that people are to some extent able to choose between 
alternative norm communities – although there are clearly constraints on such choices. 
But a legal framework protecting individual rights and freedom of association creates the 
space for like-minded individuals to establish networks and organisations and to conduct 
their affairs in terms of mutually-supported norms. The fall in the costs of communications 
means that cross-country forms of association are increasingly prevalent, and some 
norms  - such as individual rights and democracy - increasingly international in their 
domain. 
3.4  The Negative Side of Social Norms 
There are also, however, potential tensions between social norms, institutions and well-
being. For example, a strong, widely shared social norm such as gender-defined limits on 
behaviour is likely to conflict with equality of opportunity. Depending on the perspective 
adopted (i.e. the outcome desired), such norms might be regarded as negative social 
capital, or excessive social cohesion. Norms amongst a sub-group or sub-culture might be 
seen from a national perspective as illegitimately restricting individual rights, and national 
laws might be motivated in part to constrain such sub-group behaviour. A widely shared 
                                                                                                                                                 
earned it than when they regard it as a gift to them or as the outcome of a game of chance. Gorringe also 
discusses the relationships between institutions, social cohesion and growth. 
13 Palmer (1993) argues that constitutional conventions play a particularly important role in a Westminster 
Parliamentary system such as New Zealand’s in limiting the scope for abuse inherent in the concentration of 
power in Cabinet. 
14 This contrast is similar to Fukuyama’s use of the term “the radius of trust” to describe how narrow or broad 
is the norm of generalised trust in society. (See Fukuyama, 2000b). The concepts of bonding and bridging 
social capital have also been invoked to describe different types of social bonds (see Woolcock, 2001). 
Bonding social capital arises from strong ties of kin and other close social relationships; bridging social capital 
represents the weaker ties that span sub-groups in society, providing the basis for more broadly based 
personal, social and economic development Etzioni (2000) has used the term  “community of communities” to 
describe a situation where shared values across society mean that a diverse collection of smaller groups are 
part of a broader national community.  
  WP 02/12 Institutions, Social Norms and Well-being 8  
norm, such as the importance of social conformity, may contribute to a number of positive 
outcomes (e.g. low crime), but may entail some loss of individual freedom of lifestyle 
choice. At some point, widely shared perceptions, and norms of solidarity may reduce 
openness to new ideas.  Diversity can have value in stimulating competition and providing 
a variety of sources of new ideas.  
There is, in addition, a dynamic aspect to social norms. At one time, the strong ties within 
an ethnic community may provide access to capital and information that assist with the 
formation of small businesses. Subsequently, norms of obligation to fellow group 
members may restrict individual advancement.
15
 
Furthermore, there are some forms of social norms that, while positive for group insiders, 
may be negative for the overall society, and therefore detract from social capability and 
overall well-being. Informal norms can help to increase the effectiveness of close-knit 
groups, such as criminal gangs, but produce negative outcomes for the broader society. In 
less extreme cases, social norms in some sub-groups – such as youth peer groups – can 
encourage activities which are unlikely to be in the best interests of young people – such 
as dropping out of school, excessive risk-taking, or substance abuse.  
There may also be multiple equilibria. Trust breeds trust, while distrust can be extremely 
difficult to break down because of the typical absence, in a situation of distrust, of the 
social interactions required if people are to adjust their perceptions. 
16
In this situation path 
dependence is a feature, and the time frames involved in the evolution of social norms are 
in general likely to be long. On the other hand, Sunstein (1996, p. 912) argues that there 
can be a large discrepancy between people’s private judgements, and the judgements 
and behaviour they display in conformity with social norms. “For this reason current social 
states can be far more fragile than is generally thought, and small shocks can produce 
widespread changes in behaviour.” Sunstein cites the collapse of communism and 
apartheid, and, in the US, changing views on issues such as smoking in public places, as 
evidence that, on occasions, social norms can change rapidly.   
3.5  Role of Government in Fostering the Evolution of 
Social Norms 
Governments can encourage positive social norms through their own behaviour in 
important ways. International evidence suggests that a fundamental test of a country’s 
ability to support living standards and well-being at the level of the OECD is its rigorous 
and consistent adherence to the rule of law (see Section 4 below). Transparency, 
accountability, integrity, and procedural fairness in the actions of governments, politicians, 
and the civil service all seem to play an important role in supporting the same behaviours 
throughout the wider society. 
It is also fundamentally important that governments provide an effective enabling 
environment for social and economic exchanges, for the establishment of family relations, 
and for the functioning of civil society, so as to facilitate decentralized interactions and the 
emergence of social norms in these spheres of activity.  
                                                                 
15 See Putnam (2000), p. 322 for discussion of evidence on the impact of social capital on entrepreneurs in 
ethnic communities.  
16 See Gambetta (1988) for discussion on the nature of trust. “Trust is a peculiar belief predicated not on 
evidence but on the lack of contrary evidence – a feature that makes it vulnerable to deliberate destruction. In 
contrast, deep distrust is very difficult to invalidate through experience.” (p. 234).  
  WP 02/12 Institutions, Social Norms and Well-being 9  
Government also plays a pervasive role in disseminating information designed to 
influence individuals’ perceptions and therefore their decisions, and over time, to influence 
social norms.  An example is the providing of information on the health hazards of 
smoking, or on road safety.  
Beyond this, views differ sharply on the legitimacy and/or the effectiveness of government 
in actively attempting to shape or re-shape social norms and values. As Fukuyama has 
noted, views on how social norms originate tend to follow views on where they should 
come from. Libertarians consider that norms emerge from spontaneous decentralised 
social interaction – with transactions in markets being seen as an important source - and 
see little or no role for government in trying to lead the way through “social engineering” or 
undesirable paternalism.  Libertarians also point to frequent episodes of extreme 
nationalism promoted by governments as evidence of the serious risks posed by official 
attempts to re-shape social norms. Social democrats, on the other hand, view norms as 




A middle ground and the perspective adopted in this paper - is occupied by those who 
consider that, while there are serious risks in government attempting to play a very active, 
wide-ranging or coercive role, there may be some legitimate avenues, nevertheless, 
through which the government can, and should, attempt to foster the evolution over time 
of socially-beneficial norms and values. This position is conditional, however, on the 
specific details of the intervention concerned. Inappropriate or ill-conceived initiatives in 
this area risk lowering well-being rather than increasing it. This issue is returned to in 
Section V below. 
4  Channels through which Governance and 
Social Norms Impact on Well-being 
In this section, an attempt is made to specify the precise causal linkages between various 
aspects of governance and social norms, and well-being. Different broad channels are 
identified through which governance and social norms impact on well-being. For each 
channel, specific causal mechanisms are posited.  
It is acknowledged that what constitutes “good governance” is to some extent in the eye of 
the beholder, and the underlying ethical basis of good governance is not always made 
clear. In this paper good governance is broadly conceived as arrangements constraining 
the use and abuse of coercive power that are founded on individual rights, open and 
democratic practices, tolerance of diversity, and the rule of law. This definition is chosen 
on the basis both of widespread recognition in New Zealand of the intrinsic importance of  
these elements, and the international evidence on their importance in facilitating sustained 
growth in well-being. Note, however, that democratic principles and individual rights 
involve protection of minority interests, and preservation of autonomy for individuals and 
groups to organise and conduct their affairs according to their preferred norms (within the 
underlying framework of the rule of law).  
 
 
                                                                 
17 See Fukuyama (2000a), Chapter 8, and especially pp. 102-107.  
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In the Tables that follow, the channels through which good governance and social norms 
impact on well-being are divided into direct and indirect routes. A direct channel is one 
that impacts directly on a component of well-being, such as freedom of expression. An 
indirect route is one that works, for example, through its impact on economic output, which 
in turn makes possible an improvement in well-being.  
Table 1 sets out the channels through which governance may impact on well-being; 
shows the precise mechanisms through which it is suggested each channel has its 
effects; and contains selected references to empirical evidence on the effects, where such 
evidence exists and is known. Table 2 repeats the exercise with respect to the 
contribution of social norms to well-being. 
The section concludes with an assessment of the relevance of the empirical evidence to 
New Zealand.  
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Table 1: Channels – The Contribution of Governance to Well-being 
 
Channel Mechanism  Evidence 
 Direct  routes    
1 Through protecting 
important political, civil and 
individual freedoms that are 
themselves constitutive of 
well-being 
 
2 Through enabling greater 





3 Through facilitating social 













4 Through contributing 
directly to better outcomes, 
such as life expectancy, 
literacy, and the quality of the 
physical environment 
Enabling institutions such as free  
democratic elections, an independent 
judiciary, legal protections for free 
speech and human rights; protection 
of minority rights  
 
Access to official information; explicit 
consultative mechanisms 
 
Appropriate decentralization of 
expenditure responsibilities to sub-
national governments  
 
Enabling environment for economic 
exchange, such as secure property 







Enabling environment for civil 
society
18
, such as legal framework for 
civil society organisations, freedom of 
expression, a free press, open 
government 
Impact of improved “citizen voice” via 
a free press on equity of government 
policies (e.g. no mass famines have 
occurred in a democracy) 
More open, accountable, stable and 
effective public sector governance 
Less corruption strongly correlated 
with better physical environment 
Well-being is defined 
as including political, 
civil and individual 
freedoms (after Sen, 
1999) 
 




Huther and Shah 
(1998) 
 
Well-being is defined 
as including social 
interactions and 
economic exchange. 
For evidence on the 
instrumental effect of 
good governance on 
economic exchange 













                                                                 
18
 The term “civil society” is used in a variety of ways in the literature. In general, it is used here to 
mean non-government and non-market organisations (often referred to as the voluntary sector) but 
also including the media. 
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  Decentralization of expenditure 
responsibilities to sub-national 
governments 
Huther and Shah 
(1998) 
 Indirect  routes    
5. Through higher economic 
output 
Causal relationship running from 
measures of quality of public sector 
governance to levels of per capita 
income   
Corruption lowers incentives to invest 
on the part of both domestic and 
foreign investors by acting as an 
uncertain  tax on productive activity 
Corruption distorts the composition of 
government spending, away from 
education and towards large-scale 
capital projects where it is easier to 
extract bribes 
Basic civil liberties, freedom to 
organise, and an active media 
facilitate greater citizen voice and 
hence more effective government 
A more extensive and effective civil 
society is associated with higher 
economic output 
Central bank independence leads to 
lower inflation and higher growth  
Greater transparency and 
accountability strengthen incentives 
for earlier policy adjustments, and 
prevent the costly accumulation of 
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2000). 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
Mauro (1996) Shang-
Jin Wei (1997) World 
Economic Forum 
(1997)  
Mauro (1996) Tanzi 










Cukierman, Webb and 
Neyapti (1992) 
 
  Political and civil freedoms can 
facilitate the emergence of shared 
norms over time, such as trust and 
tolerance, and social values such as 
the importance of education or 
attitudes toward protecting the 
environment. Shared norms, in turn, 
facilitate the achievement of social 
consensus (i.e. the reduction of 
transactions costs) that facilitates 
more efficient collective action and 
economic exchange 
See Table 2 below for 
discussion of the 
channels through which 
social norms impact on 
well-being 
6 Through strengthening state 
capability 
Corruption and the absence of the 
rule of law cause taxpayers to resort 
to private mechanisms to protect 
property and enforce contracts, and 
are therefore correlated with a larger 
share of the unofficial economy in 
GDP 
Johnson, Kaufman and 
Zoido-Lobaton (1998)  
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Virtuous and vicious circles    
8. Interactions between 
political and civil freedoms, 
and the evolution of shared 
norms 
The exercise of freedom is mediated 
by values, which are in turn  
influenced by public discussions and 
social interactions, which are 
themselves influenced by 
participatory freedoms (as suggested 
by Sen 1999) 
See Table 2 below for 
discussion of the 
channels through which 
social norms impact on 
well-being 
9.  Interactions between 
declining state capability and 
the extent of the unofficial 
economy 
As state capability declines, 
taxpayers receive lower quality public 
services, resort to private 
alternatives, and shift activities 
underground, further weakening state 
capability. Process can work in 
reverse, although many states 
appear trapped in a low level 
equilibrium 
World Bank (2000) 
10. Interactions between 
participatory democracy and 
basic educational skills 
 
Democratic participation requires 
basic educational skills such as 
literacy and numeracy; widespread 
democratic participation, in turn, is 




11 Interactions between the 
enabling environment for civil 
society, and the effectiveness 
of government 
A good enabling environment for civil 
society (e.g. civil liberties,  
government decision-making 
transparency) creates the space for 
social bonds to be created in the 
voluntary sector. In turn, an effective 
civil society can generate pressure 
for more effective and accountable 
government 
Isham, Kaufman and 
Pritchett (1997) 
12 Interactions between a 
country’s constitution and 
social norms concerning the 
legitimate use of coercive 
power 
A potential evolutionary cycle of 
constitutional dialogue and values 
(reflected in informal constitutional 
conventions) and formal 
constitutional provisions, that may 
under some circumstances exert 
mutually reinforcing pressures on 
government that constrain the abuse 
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Table 2: Channels – The Contribution of Social Norms to Well-
being 
 
Channel Mechanism  Evidence 
 Direct  routes    
1  Through facilitating greater 
participation in all spheres, 
meeting human needs for 
sociability, recognition and 
identity 
2  Through protecting 
important political, civil and 
individual freedoms that are 
themselves constitutive of 
well-being 
3  Through promoting 
physical safety and security 
and reducing conflict 
 
Norms of fairness, reciprocity and 
individual responsibility reduce 
barriers to inter-personal relations, by 
reducing transaction costs and 
enhancing generalized trust 
Constitutional conventions guide the 
legitimate use of coercive power by 
governments, and constrain the 
abuse of power (as suggested by 
Palmer, 1993) 
Norms of non-violence, fairness and 
respect for the rights and interests of 
minors and other vulnerable groups 
reduce the incidence of violence and 
exploitation in the community, and 
reduce the extent of conflict 
Knack and Keefer 
(1997) 
 
                          
Ostrom (2000) 
 
 Indirect  routes    















Social divisions, in terms of ethnicity 
and income, and corrupt public 
institutions, result in an inability to 
generate social consensus, reducing 
the ability to adjust to economic 
shocks 
Trust and shared values reduce 
transaction costs in the private 
sector; and may encourage 
investment 
The norm of reciprocity facilitates the 
production of local public goods and 
the management of common pool 
resources 
The norm of fairness reduces the 
room for conflict, and helps settle 
conflict when it does occur, thus 
reducing transaction costs and 
increasing economic growth 
 
 
Trust and shared values increase 
state effectiveness through voluntary 
compliance with laws, taxes and 
regulations 
Rodrik (1999 and 
2000) Easterly (1999 
and 2000) 
                             
 
Knack and Keefer 
(1997) La Porta et al 






evidence on the 
existence of a norm of 
fairness and its effects 
on individual 
behaviour (cited in 
Gorringe, 1995) 
La Porta et al (1997)  
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5 Through higher non-
economic output 
Norms of fairness and reciprocity 
facilitate a higher level of output by 
civil society organisations 
 
Virtuous and vicious 
circles 
  
6 Interactions between trust 
and the effectiveness of 
institutions 
7 Interactions between shared 








8 Interactions between civil 
strife and quality of 
governance 
Trust enhances the effectiveness of 
institutions, which in turn builds 
further trust 
Social cohesion may contribute to 
higher economic output (as above); 
and economic growth may in turn 
contribute to social cohesion by 
changing individual’s subjective 
feelings about the degree of well-
being they derive from belonging to 
their society (as suggested by 
Gorringe, 1995, and Bates, 1996) 
In the presence of two or three large 
competing ethnic groups, weak 
governments are associated with civil 
strife 











Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998) 
Low level equilibrium 
trap 
  
9 Lack of trust can be very 
difficult to break down 
A lack of generalized inter-personal 
trust is associated with lack of social 
and economic interactions. In the 
absence of such interactions, it is 
difficult to revise one’s view of the 
trustworthiness of others. In a low 
trust society it is rational to exploit 
others rather than to trust them 
Putnam (1993) 
4.2  Relevance of Empirical Evidence to New Zealand 
19 
Much of the evidence on the growth effects of governance and social cohesion comes 
from large cross-country data sets that include both developed and developing countries. 
The differences across countries, in terms of the details of their institutional and social 
arrangements, necessitate caution in interpreting the relevance of the results to New 
Zealand – although it is possible that a broad panel of countries will generate a sufficiently 
strong signal to overcome the “noise” in the data created by inter-country heterogeneity. In 
fact, it might be argued that a wide sample of rich, middle-income and poor countries has 
the advantage of incorporating a wider than usual range of variation in institutional 
variables affecting growth. This may make it possible to draw more accurate inferences 
about the relative importance of different factors for economic growth than is possible 
when looking exclusively at richer countries. For example, evidence on the importance of 
the rule of law, which shows up from large cross-country samples, serves to remind policy 
makers in richer countries of the need to maintain and reinvigorate the framework of law 
and regulation which enables economic life to thrive, and which may often be taken for 
granted. 
                                                                 
19 The first three paragraphs in this section are drawn from material drafted by Nick Mays – see Mays and 
Petrie (2000), pp. 35-41.  
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It does nevertheless seem likely that developed countries such as New Zealand are 
located on the flatter part of any curve relating economic and social outcomes to the 
quality of governance. Our institutional heritage gives New Zealand reason to be confident 
of the basic soundness of its underpinning institutions. New Zealand’s rating on 
international surveys, such as the quality of institutions in the Global Competitiveness 
Report, and the perceived absence of corruption as measured by Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, lend support to such a conclusion. 
20
  
It may be, however, that continual attention to the quality of governance is most important 
in developed countries to prevent a country falling behind in terms of average material 
standards of living. As in all areas, it also seems likely that a reputation (in this instance, 
for high quality governance) takes time to build but can be quickly eroded. Furthermore, 
governance reform has been high on the agenda of most developed countries in recent 
years. This suggests that New Zealand needs to keep making progress in order just to 
stay still in relative terms.  
These broad observations on the relevance of governance to New Zealand’s prospects 
are strengthened considerably by the challenge of establishing a more solid basis for 
inter-group co-operation and cohesion in New Zealand. In particular, the large size and 
over-representation in lower socio-economic groups of the indigenous Maori population, 
and the Maori sense of historical injustice, place New Zealand in an unusual position in 
comparison to many other OECD countries.  
 
There is also evidence of significant diversity in underlying world-views across different 
cultural groups in New Zealand. The evidence comes from a small number of national 
surveys conducted over the last fifteen years or so, chiefly the New Zealand Study of 
Values, which has seen three surveys (1985, 1989 and 1998).
21  
 
Webster has analysed these surveys and, on the basis of respondent self-identification, 
considers there are at least six distinct cultures in New Zealand, which he labels (in 
descending order of size) New Zealander, Pakeha, European, Maori-Maori (Ethnic Maori 
who identify as “above all a Maori”), Maori-New Zealander (Ethnic Maori who identify as 
“above all a New Zealander”), and Pacific Peoples. 
22 On the basis of an analysis of the 
patterns of values revealed in responses to the more than three hundred questions in the 
surveys, Webster argues that the presence of these distinct cultures is further borne out 
by distinct clusterings of views across these groups.  
 
Of particular interest in the current context is evidence Webster presents on divergent 
views towards various aspects of governance and social norms, which he suggests 
illustrate the potential for future social conflict in New Zealand. For instance, on the basis 
of Webster’s analysis. 
23  Strength of support for democracy: while 73% of “Pakeha” 
considered a strong leader who does not need Parliament to be very bad, only 34% of 
“Maori-Maori” thought so; while only 13% of “New Zealanders” thought democracy was 
ineffective due to poor decision-making, 47% of “Maori-Maori” thought so; and while 84% 
of “New Zealanders” considered that rule by the army would be very bad, only 59% of 
“Pacific Peoples”, 64% of “Maori-Zealanders” and 64% of “Maori-Maori” thought so.   
Support for the Treaty of Waitangi: while only 1% of “Maori-Maori” wanted to abolish the 
Treaty, 49% of “Europeans” did.  Civic morality: while 91% of “New Zealanders” 
considered accepting bribes in the course of duties to be unjustifiable, only 72% of “Maori-
Maori” thought so; while 83% of “New Zealanders” considered claiming unentitled benefits 
                                                                 
20 See World Economic Forum (1999) and Transparency International (2000a). 
21 On the latter see Perry and Webster (1999). 
22 The two Maori ethnic groups were of approximately equal size in Webster’s sample. Webster also identifies 
a common core of values, defined as those values on which the main cultures do not disagree, which he labels 
Kiwi culture. 
23 Webster reports the results cited below as being at the 95% confidence level.  
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to be unjustifiable, only 47% of “Pacific Peoples” thought so.  Interpersonal trust: while 
57% of “New Zealanders” considered that most people could be trusted, only 33% of 
“Maori-Maori” held this view.  Confidence in the Police: 84% amongst “Pakeha”, but only 
55% amongst “Maori-Maori”. 
 
Of course, while self-identified cultural grouping may be associated with distinct 
clusterings of beliefs, factors other than culture may be causing these differences. 
Webster has cross-tabulated the above results by education level, self-reported social 
class, and household income. Views on the ineffectiveness of democracy were strongest 
amongst those with only primary education (44%), and lowest amongst those with 
completed tertiary education (28%). Support for abolishing the Treaty was highest 
amongst those with only primary education (42%) and those in the lowest income bracket 
(47%), and lowest amongst those with completed tertiary education (20%) and those in 
the highest income bracket (24%). Confidence in the Police, on the other hand, was 
highest amongst those with only primary education (86%), and lowest amongst those with 
completed tertiary education (75%). 
24 
 
Commenting on these results, Webster suggests that, by themselves, beliefs such as 
those referred to above may be fairly inconsequential. He considers, however, that the 
way in which the beliefs are clustered illustrates that there is fertile ground in New Zealand 
for mutual antagonism and manipulative politics, with the potential for democracy to be 
restricted in the name of individual freedom or historical rights. “Destabilization will be 
most conspicuous when the heart of the culture – in our case a belief in democracy – is 
seriously disregarded. Such is not yet the case in New Zealand, but there are disquieting 
signals.” 
25 He also states: “There is extreme conflict on the Maori rights value, which puts 
great stress on the core value of respect. It also exposes the fragility of the sanction 
against violence, since it could be asked whether desecration of rights is such a failure of 
relationships between people that violence is an inevitable outcome.” 
26 
 
Elsewhere Webster has suggested that the evidence shows there is a quite narrow core 
value culture in New Zealand. “For example, while the ideal of a fair go for everyone is 
certainly a piece of our national wisdom, it is held in entirely different ways by different 
segments….consensus is today not nearer but farther away, and ..the solutions we look 
for must involve not biculturalism but a dynamic multiculturalism…In this light, the search 
for common values, while not mistaken, may miss the real question, which is to do with 
the conflicting values of significantly distinct cultures in this country.” 
27 
 
The existence of a large disadvantaged indigenous minority, and the comparative 
uncertainty that exists over legitimacy and property rights, may well mean, therefore, that 
the quality of governance is more important to New Zealand’s future prospects than is the 
case for many other similarly advanced countries. 
 
Easterly (2000), for instance, draws attention to the potential role of institutions in helping 
in the management of ethnic diversity.  He found evidence that ethnic diversity had a more 
harmful effect on economic policy and economic growth when key institutions were 
susceptible to corruption and were incapable of protecting the interests of minorities. 
Collier and Hoeffler’s finding – that the importance of governance is heightened by the 
presence of two or three large and competing ethnic groups – also appears to be relevant. 
 
                                                                 
24 Source: personal communication with the author. 
25 Webster (2001), p. 88. 
26 Webster (2001), p. 164. 
27 See the “Core values” debate facilitated by the New Zealand Herald.  
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Further observations from the 1998 New Zealand Survey of Values relevant to discussion 
of governance in New Zealand are 
28
 70% of respondents agreed that the country is run 
by a few big interests looking out for themselves (the corresponding number in 1989 was 
54%).  71% rated New Zealand’s political system in 1998 on the “bad” side of the 
continuum, while only 29% rated the pre-MMP system as “bad”.  Only 15% had 
confidence in Parliament.  While 29% had confidence in the public service, this was down 
from 49% in 1985. 
Beyond these considerations based on the reported views of New Zealanders, there are 
also features of our economy that make us vulnerable to international sentiment about the 
quality and integrity of public sector governance. These features include a large and 
chronic current account deficit, and the highest external (total public and private) debt to 
GDP ratio of any OECD country. The 2000 IMF review of New Zealand concluded that the 
high degree of policy transparency and accountability is a key mitigating factor limiting 
New Zealand’s exposure to international investor concern over our degree of foreign 
indebtedness.
29
 From another perspective, a reputation for high quality governance might 
be a source of competitive advantage, by making New Zealand a more attractive 
destination for foreign direct investment. 
There are, in addition, a number of other risks to the quality of governance in New 
Zealand. These include the increasing international exposure of our society and economy, 
including the higher levels of interaction of New Zealanders with people from countries in 
which corruption is the norm or at least widely tolerated. Relevant also is the deterioration 
in governance in our immediate region (for example, in Fiji and the Solomon Islands). 
Possible transmission mechanisms include trade, foreign investment, immigration, tax 
evasion, and criminal activity. 
A public sector management environment with an unusually high level of delegation of 
authority within central government. Discarding the thick rule-book by which the central 
agencies regulated in detail the operation of the public sector was a necessary means to 
creating a more responsive and efficient public service. However, it has placed a premium 
on ethics and integrity to maintain public confidence in a more decentralised system of 
government. A number of incidents of corruption and mal-administration in recent years 
may well have reduced public confidence in the public service (as suggested by survey 
results). Concerns have also been expressed about a breakdown in the convention that 
Ministers should defend public servants from attack. 
30
 This convention is part of a 
broader set of norms related to the duties of public servants to be loyal and politically 
neutral.  The scope for conflicts of interest given our small size. 
The increasing heterogeneity of New Zealand society. A particular risk here is the degree 
of self-justification that people can advance in the presence of multiple and conflicting 
norms, for behaviour that breaches previously widely accepted standards.  There is a 
perception that New Zealand is susceptible to large policy swings and policy instability, 
compared to a number of other developed countries. This may be due to our small size 
and relative lack of institutional checks and balances – for example, no Upper House of 
Parliament, few independent public policy think tanks - compared to many countries. 
Indeed, one of the explanations for the extent of the reforms in the 1980s is likely to be 
New Zealand’s failure to adjust its policies earlier and more gradually to the changed 
economic circumstances after 1973. 
Public expectations of government by New Zealanders are also probably higher now than 
a decade ago. For instance, recent discussions with the Voluntary Sector Working Group, 
                                                                 
28 See Perry and Webster (1999), pp. 42, 44 and 47. 
29 See IMF (2000), pp. 22-23.  
30 See Palmer (2001), pp. 15-16 for discussion of the risks to the quality of public administration in New 
Zealand from what he sees as an unhealthy recent increase in the tendency of politicians to criticise public 
servants publicly.  
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as well as Treasury’s more limited contacts with NGOs, suggest there is a demand for a 
more open and genuinely consultative approach by government.  
Beyond these general considerations, that suggest attention to the quality of governance 
in New Zealand is likely to have pay-offs for economic performance and the quality of 
democracy, there is a range of specific governance issues warranting closer examination, 
discussed in the next section.  
5  Strengthening the Governance of Public 
Institutions in New Zealand
31 
A full discussion of the quality of governance in New Zealand would need to traverse the 
fundamental elements of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. In this paper the 
nature of our representative democracy and its key institutions are largely taken as given. 
32
 The approach here has been to draw on the theoretical literature on institutional design, 
and to assess existing arrangements against international standards and norms of good 
governance. The focus is on enhancing the functioning of existing public institutions 
through strengthening transparency and accountability. 
33
 The section concludes with 
some brief remarks about the potential role of government in fostering the evolution of 
social norms in New Zealand.  
The analytical approach adopted draws on agency theory, in which the relationships 
between the electorate, Parliament, the government, and the public service are viewed as 
a series of principal/agent relationships (after Moe, 1984). The task of institutional design 
is to maximise the advantages of delegation of control to an agent, while minimizing the 
scope for agents to pursue their own interests at the expense of the principal’s interests 
(i.e. to minimize agency costs).   Principal/agent theory stresses the importance of the ex 
ante specification of roles and responsibilities of agents, reporting of performance by 
agents, and the ex post monitoring of performance by principals. 
34
 
The concept of a national integrity system, as developed by Jeremy Pope and 
Transparency International, has also informed this paper’s suggestions for governance 
issues that are of potential concern in New Zealand.
35
  A national integrity system is the 
set of institutions necessary to ensure good governance in any society. These include an 
independent judiciary and judicial review, a free press, freedom of information legislation, 
open budget processes, active non-government organisations, and effective watch-dog 
institutions such as an Auditor-General and Ombudsman. These components interact and 
reinforce each other, creating a network of horizontal accountability strands that can 
effectively constrain vertical power. The integrity system is ultimately dependant, however, 
on the strength of its foundations in society’s values and the willingness of the populace at 
large to defend those values. 
Given these analytical perspectives, and the discussion in the first four sections of the 
paper, the following priority areas for strengthening the governance of public institutions in 
New Zealand are suggested for consideration.  
                                                                 
31 This section draws substantially on an earlier paper by the author, Transparency and Accountability in New 
Zealand: An Assessment, which was written in the author’s capacity as Executive Officer for TI-NZ, the New 
Zealand Chapter of Transparency International. See Petrie (2001). 
32 One exception perhaps is the discussion of the allocation of powers between central and local government 
on pages 27-28 below. 
33 The quality of corporate governance in the private sector is also an important element of an overall 
assessment of the quality of governance in New Zealand. This is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
34 See OECD (1999) for a detailed discussion of principal/agent theory and its application to the public sector. 
35 See Transparency International (2000), pp. 31-40.  
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5.1  Greater Accountability for the Results of Government 
Activities 
Accountability for results is fundamental to good governance in any system of 
government. There is reason to be concerned that in some areas New Zealand lags 
behind other developed countries in this respect. In particular, accountability for the 




Accountability for the outcomes of government spending is widely acknowledged to have 
proven a weak part of our public management system. 
37
 There is a relative lack of 
adequate information on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of government spending 
in achieving intended results. In addition to improved accountability, there is arguably a 
democratic right for the electorate to have access to such information.  
There are, of course, inherent difficulties in assessing the impact of outputs on outcomes 
for many public sector activities (see for instance OECD 1999). However, there are also a 
number of activities where it is possible to develop meaningful indicators of intermediate 
outcomes that measure some of the impacts of government activity on the community. 
While there are also reasons to think that a small country such as New Zealand will invest 
a relatively modest amount on research and evaluation compared to larger countries, 
there are, nevertheless, likely to be cost-effective initiatives that could be taken to improve 
performance in this area.  
The importance of comprehensive outcome reporting, together with better research and 
evaluation, is also being increasingly recognised internationally as a means of achieving 
more integrated and coherent policies. Recent work by the OECD on sustainable 
development stresses the importance for sustainability of a number of elements of public 
sector governance, including improving the evidence base of government policies, 
publication of outcome indicators, and improving openness and accountability. 
38
 
A move to publishing better information on outcomes should involve various levels the 
sectoral level or major portfolio area, with comprehensive reporting of these at a whole of 
government level and at the individual departmental or agency level, by driving strategic 
plans off an outcomes focus, reporting performance against outcome targets in annual 
reports, and measuring value for money in outcome terms.   
Such an approach would help to promote more informed public debate and questioning of 
the effectiveness of government policies and programmes. It should also spur an 
improvement in the current relatively low capability of the New Zealand public service to 
articulate the “intervention logic” linking outputs to outcomes, to generate the necessary 
data, and to conduct the required analyses. 




 and the publication of The Social 
Report are evidence of a necessary start towards a greater focus on outcomes in the New 
                                                                 
36 The term “outcomes” is used in this section to refer to two distinct phenomena. The first refers to the results 
of a government action (a law, regulation, or spending programme) in terms of its impacts on the community. 
This is the sense in which the term is used in the Public Finance Act. The second meaning of outcomes refers 
to “state of the nation” statistics that report the status of an indicator – for example, life expectancy – that is the 
outcome of a variety of causes many of which are beyond the influence of government.  
37
  See Petrie and Webber (1999), paragraphs 69-74 for a summary of findings by those who have 
reviewed New Zealand’s public management reforms. 
38 See OECD (2001b). 
39 The CAP (Capability, Accountability and Performance) pilot was introduced in four departments in 1999 to 
trial a package of new planning and accountability documentation. One of the key aims of CAP is to generate 
an increased emphasis on the outcomes of government spending.  
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Zealand public management system. Extending this systematically and grafting it onto the 
existing accountability regime - in which formal accountability remains tied to the delivery 
of outputs - will require careful design and implementation if overall accountability is to be 
effectively strengthened. 
There are also some weaknesses in accountability for tax policy.
41
 While the Generic Tax 
Policy Process has improved the operational and legislative phases, particularly through 
the development of tax policy in a consultative environment, there is little transparency or 
attention given to desired tax policy outcomes at an aggregate level. There is also a lack 
of information on “tax expenditures” (i.e. tax concessions, tax deferrals, tax holidays, or 
other special tax treatments that represent a departure from some defined “normal” tax 
base). Given the apparent level of interest in New Zealand in introducing new tax 
concessions, this is a potentially serious deficiency in transparency, and is one of the very 
few areas where New Zealand does not meet international standards in fiscal 
transparency.
42
 Finally, there are limited (and non-independent) post implementation 
reviews of new tax policies.  
Remedies that should be considered include requirements for governments to publish a 
statement of their desired tax policy outcomes and progress in achieving them; annual 
publication of tax expenditure statements;
43
 and increased resourcing and involvement of 
independent policy analysts. 
44
 
Initiatives to strengthen accountability for the results of government activities in areas 
such as spending and taxation could result over time in less policy instability, as improved 
evidence and knowledge about “what works” narrows the scope for hasty or ill-considered 
policy change. 
Finally, the Svensson review of monetary policy in 2001 raised some important concerns 
about accountability for the implementation of monetary policy in NZ. 
45
 Svensson 
recommended a number of changes, including greater resourcing of Parliament’s Finance 
and Expenditure Committee (FEC) to enable it to review more effectively the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. It is also questionable whether the FEC has sufficient resources to 
engage independent advice on the soundness of the policy underlying proposed changes 
to tax law.  
These are specific instances of a much more general issue. In a Parliamentary system, 
particularly one with a unicameral House, significant power is vested in the hands of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 Pathfinder is an initiative launched in 2001 to develop outcome measurement and management, initially in 
eight government agencies. 
41 This paragraph has benefited from input from Peter Wilson. 
42 Presenting an annual statement of tax expenditures with the Budget is a requirement of the International 
Monetary Fund’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency. (See the IMF’s Fiscal Transparency Manual 
(IMF 2001) for a discussion of tax expenditure reporting). The 2001 McLeod Tax Review reported that it 
received many submissions arguing for tax incentives across a large number of activities, without identification 
of how they should be financed. The review also noted the risk that tax incentive policy can easily become 
politicised, with resources being captured by concentrated interest groups. See McLeod (2001), p. 22. 
43 There are obvious conceptual difficulties in defining the benchmark against which tax expenditures are 
assessed. However, half of the OECD’s member countries now report tax expenditures, including Australia, 
which has done so since the 1980s. The conceptual problems should not be used as an excuse to avoid 
reporting in this area. The McLeod review took a similar position in recommending that the government should 
consider the concept further (see McLeod (2001), pp. 23-24.  
44 This can be hard to achieve in the tax area, due to the complexity of the law, and the fact that many of those 
with the necessary expertise are conflicted by being advisors to government or business. A welcome recent 
development, however, is the initiative by Victoria University’s Centre for Accounting, Governance and 
Taxation to bring a top US tax economist to New Zealand under a private sector-funded research scholarship 
to work on the issue of capital gains taxation.  
45 See Svensson (2001).  
  WP 02/12 Institutions, Social Norms and Well-being 22  
government that can command a majority in Parliament.  An important check on the 
effectiveness of the executive is exercised through the scrutiny activities of Select 
Committees of Parliament.   
Ensuring the New Zealand Parliament is adequately resourced is fundamental to the 
quality of governance, and is an issue worthy of further in-depth investigation and 
analysis. For instance, the current balance of resources between the executive and 
legislative branches might be reviewed. 
5.2  Ethics in Public Institutions 
The Mixed Member Proportional electoral system is widely considered to have increased 
the influence of individual MPs on Parliamentary outcomes, and it is predicted this will 
lead to an increase in lobbying of MPs.
46
 While lobbying can be socially beneficial – by 
improving the information available to decision-makers – where MPs take or shift positions 
in response to narrow, well-placed sectional interests behind closed doors, there is the 
potential for abuse of office. A change that should be considered, therefore, is the 
introduction of a Leadership Code for Parliamentarians, covering issues such as conflicts 
of interest, public disclosure of private interests, and acceptance of gifts and hospitality – 
similar to the provisions in the Cabinet Office Manual applying to Ministers. It would be 
prudent to extend this sort of practice to cover all MPs, as suggested for instance by Sir 
Geoffrey and Matthew Palmer in their book Bridled Power. They argue that it would be 
desirable for action to be taken now in this area before an incident presses home its 
necessity.   
 
There is a similar gap at local government level. Given the scope for conflicts of interest in 
local government – for example in granting resource consents – consideration should be 
given to introducing a requirement that all local governments have in place a Code of 
Conduct that deals with integrity issues. This could be inserted in the Local Government 
Act (LGA). 
There would also be merit in considering moves to strengthen the ethical environment in 
the judiciary.  There have been one or two high profile instances in recent years of 
perceived impropriety by members of the judiciary. Concerns have also been raised about 
conflicts of interest faced by judges. It is critically important for the public to have full 
confidence in the judiciary – particularly given the over-representation of Maori and low 
socio-economic groups in crime statistics. 
In order to minimise the need for Parliament to intervene in individual cases to remove a 
dishonest judge – which could undermine the perceived independence of the judiciary - 
the judiciary should act to discipline its own members more effectively. 
47
 One way to 
achieve this would be through the introduction by the judiciary of a Code of Conduct for 
Judges, which could set out more clearly the norms of what is acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour by a judge. In a related vein, there would also be merit in 
reviewing the degree of public access to court information in New Zealand. 
Finally, incidents in recent years have heightened awareness of risks to public confidence 
in the integrity of the public service. This is reflected in discussion in the State Services 
                                                                 
46 See Palmer and Palmer (1997), p.16 and pp. 198-202.  
47 International experience suggests that “the involvement of the senior judiciary itself in policing its own 
members in a public fashion is generally regarded as the best guarantee of independence [of the judiciary].” 
See Transparency International (2000), p. 68.  
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Commissioner’s 2000 Annual Report,
48
 and in the appointment of the State Sector 
Standards Board.  
The recent incidents appear to be isolated instances of fraud or maladministration. 
However, it is difficult to demonstrate  that serious misconduct is not more widespread, 
and/or will not become so. One response would be for the government to consider 
commissioning a survey of public servant understanding of, and attitudes towards, 
standards and integrity. International experience suggests that surveys of public officials 
can be an effective means of identifying areas of vulnerability in public institutions. 
49
 In 
New Zealand such a survey could aim to establish whether there is a problem, and the 
dimensions of any problem. It might help focus any remedial efforts on priority areas, and 
it could establish a benchmark for subsequent monitoring.  
5.3  The Governance of Crown/Maori Relationships 
50 
There are a number of governance issues in the relationship between the Crown and 
Maori that warrant attention. Key issues include the adequacy of the enabling environment 
for collective Maori organisation, and accountability requirements for the transfer of Treaty 
of Waitangi settlement assets. 
At present, Maori are utilising a range of legal entities to conduct their affairs, including 
Maori Trust Boards (under the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955), Charitable Trusts, and 
Incorporated Societies. However, some features of Maori kinship-based organisation do 
not mesh well with the presumptions of New Zealand law. For example, Maori 
organisations have difficulty registering as charitable trusts because the public benefit test 
requires that beneficiaries not be related by blood. The Maori Trust Boards Act, on the 
other hand, is a dated piece of legislation, under which accountability in many areas is to 
the Minister of Maori Affairs rather than directly to Trust Board beneficiaries. Most Treaty 
claimants currently use the structure of a common law trust, but there is a view amongst 
officials that the existence of an alternative standardised legal personality for claimant 
groups to incorporate under would have facilitated the Treaty settlements process.  
The Maori Community Development Act 1962 is a further piece of enabling legislation, 
which promotes a pan-Maori rather than tribal approach. Initial work on a review of the Act 
by Te Puni Kokiri in 1998 concluded, inter alia, that provision should be made for Maori 
community groups to acquire legal status to better enable them to deliver services to local 
clients. The review was not completed, however, due to other Ministerial priorities. 
Consideration of the continued appropriateness of these Acts, and of the overall enabling 
environment for Maori collective organisation, should be accorded priority.  
A second important issue is whether, in requiring that Treaty of Waitangi settlement 
assets be transferred to accountable asset management structures, government has the 
balance right between a permissive approach, with very general governance requirements 
of recipients, and a somewhat more prescriptive approach.  
As argued by Greenland, iwi governance (and Maori collective governance more 
generally) faces a number of unique challenges. In terms of Ostrom’s design principles for 
successful self-organization (Section 3 above), Maori collective organisation suffers from 
a lack of certainty over who has rights to draw on collective resources, a lack of clarity in 
                                                                 
48
 See SSC (2000), pp. 1-6. 
49 See Kaufman et al (2000), pp. 12-13. 
50 This section draws on Greenland, “Building the Inclusive Economy: Maori Governance” (undated), which 
should be referred to for a more lengthy and in-depth discussion of these issues.  
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who represents whom, 
51
 a lack of clarity in vertical relationships between hapu and iwi, 
inadequate legal vehicles for collective organisation and diverging and still evolving 
notions of the appropriate relationship between members and trustees, and a lack of 
participation by individual iwi members in governance. 
Added to these fundamental challenges is a rapidly changing and complex mix of social, 
economic and cultural objectives that iwi and other groups are pursuing. 
Ostrom’s empirical work also suggests that successful and enduring self-organisation is 
associated with users of the resources designing their own rules, rather than having them 
externally imposed. Developing a capacity for “share-holder activism” by iwi members is 
important to ensuring the satisfactory functioning of governance structures and the 
accountability of leaders. How iwi governance evolves in coming years and decades, and 
the manner in which different iwi reconcile norms of tikanga with Western democratic 
practice, seem likely to be an important influence on the relative performance of iwi over 
time. In this sense there is scope for competition between different institutional 
arrangements.  
In this situation, one could argue that government’s role should be limited to providing 
minimum enabling conditions and leaving the evolution of iwi governance norms to Maori 
to determine (including through appeal to the courts). However, the role of iwi and other 
collective groups as the recipients of public resources from Treaty claims, and the need to 
ensure the durability of Treaty settlements, means that iwi governance is likely to continue 
to be an area of contested norms in New Zealand. The lack of participation by members is 
also a risk to the durability of Treaty settlements. 
52
 
The approach of the Office of Treaty Settlements (OTS) on this issue has been to review 
the governance structure proposed by a claimant group against broad principles including 
accountability, transparency and representation.  Subsequently, the Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission (TOKM) developed and disseminated benchmarks of good 
governance to ensure that when fishing quota is allocated to iwi it is to entities meeting 
some minimum specified measures of transparency and accountability.
53
 More recently 
OTS has adopted a more specific, although still evolving, approach and now requires 
claimants to submit information in response to twenty questions on aspects of 
governance.
54
 OTS uses this as a checklist in its assessment of the governance 
arrangements, although the primary aim of the twenty questions is to ensure more 
complete disclosure of the governance arrangements to the individual claimant group 
members. OTS has no explicitly stated minimum standards against which it assesses the 
governance arrangements. This is in contrast to the specific governance requirements 
developed by TOKM.  
The government’s policy on the appropriate balance between a permissive and a more 
prescriptive approach to iwi governance is an important issue, and is one worthy of more 
                                                                 
51 One development of interest here is the development of a Maori Registration Service by the Tautoko Maori Trust 
interim committee. The Service will assist groups to compile accurate and comprehensive registers of their 
members. See Treasury, 2001, p. 57 for further discussion. 
52 Although 80-98% of participating beneficiaries have supported Treaty settlements to date, only two settlements 
have been endorsed by a majority of claimant group members entitled to vote, due to low voter turn-out. 
53 See Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (2001). Iwi governance requirements set by TOKM include 
reasonable access for all iwi members to participate in a regular electoral process for their representatives on the iwi 
organisation, and a constitution that entrenches this and contains a clear process for constitutional amendments. At 
December 2001, it is understood only one iwi met these minimum requirements in full, although a number of others 
were considered close to meeting them. The Commission has also signalled its intention to prescribe structural 
arrangements so that the different functions carried out by iwi (such as income generation and benefit distribution) 
are separated in the interests of transparency and accountability. The Commission has been working with iwi in an 
effort to assist them to develop their governance structures and processes. It is understood the Commission does 
not intend to dilute these requirements despite pressure from some quarters for it to do so. 
54 See Hampton and Falloon (2001). p.6.  
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policy attention than has been the case to date. The government might also play a more 
active role in building the constituency for good governance amongst iwi, for example, 
through facilitating the availability of emerging best practice models of community 
governance.  
Greenland has concluded that the potential for improvements in the governance of Maori 
community processes to generate improvements in Maori well-being has not been well-
recognised by policy-makers. He suggests that “the conjunction of the Treaty settlements 
process, the decentralisation of government functions and more recently the focus on 
capacity building [in Maori communities] offers an opportunity for government to 
encourage Maori interests (kin or non-kin, rural or urban) to build strong institutions 
characterised by robust governance, thereby building their social capability and enhancing 
well-being.” (Greenland, p.12). 
5.4  Greater Transparency of Regulation 
Regulation of the private sector remains a key instrument of government action, having 
important effects on economic efficiency and fairness. It is an important arena for ensuring 
opportunities for democratic participation in policy making. Regulation may also become 
increasingly attractive in New Zealand, both because of the high degree of transparency 
of fiscal policies, and because - in an MMP environment where governments will often be 
less assured of Parliamentary majorities – many regulations can be introduced without the 
need for Parliamentary approval. 
55
 Despite changes in recent years to improve the 
regulation making process in New Zealand, and the new business compliance cost regime 
that came into effect from 1 April 2001, some areas of concern remain.  
One element of transparency that is lacking is the routine disclosure of proposals for 
regulations prior to their submission to Cabinet. (This includes legislation, Orders-in-
Council and tertiary-level regulations). Routine disclosure would provide an opportunity for 
wider public input than might have occurred through selective consultation, and would 
increase the transparency of the rationale justifying new or amended regulations.
56
 
A further area for consideration is the lack of clarity over accountability for a Regulatory 
Impact Statement (RIS). At present an RIS is prepared by the relevant department, but is 
attached as an annex to the Minister’s paper to Cabinet recommending a new or 
amended regulation. In this situation it may not always be entirely clear who is 
accountable for the content of the RIS. It would be desirable to clarify this. 
Finally, there is a potential tension between the adoption by New Zealand of international 
regulatory standards, and the ability of New Zealanders to make representations to, and 
to hold standard setters accountable. This is illustrated most clearly where responsibility 
for setting standards in New Zealand is allocated to a single trans-national institution – 
such as the Australia-New Zealand Food Standards Authority. Where New Zealand is 
integrating with an international standard, there is a need to consider carefully the options 




                                                                 
55 This point is made by Palmer and Palmer (1997), p. 14, and applies to secondary legislation made by Order 
in Council under an empowering Act of Parliament. 
56 Routine disclosure of proposals for regulation prior to submission to Cabinet is not suggested as an 
alternative to appropriate public consultation at an earlier stage of the process, but as supplementary to more 
specific consultation. 
57 See Goddard (undated) for discussion of different legal approaches to achieving a common set of rules 
between New Zealand and a foreign jurisdiction, and possible means of building in safeguards to protect 
opportunities for New Zealand voice. See also OECD (1994), pp. 84-90 for discussion of transparency, 
participation and accountability issues in international regulatory cooperation.  
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One way forward would be to explore the introduction of a Regulatory Responsibility Act. 
This might contain a statement of principles of good regulatory practice, clear assignment 
of accountabilities, and a disclosure regime to facilitate monitoring of compliance with the 
principles. This could provide a legislative safeguard against misuse of regulation-making 
powers by future governments, and might be seen as usefully buttressing New Zealand’s 
internationally recognised accountability arrangements for fiscal and monetary policy.  
At the same time, the government could consider inviting the OECD to review New 
Zealand’s performance in this area, in line with the country review process the OECD has 
in place as part of its work programme on regulatory reform. 
5.5  Transparency of Public Appointments Processes 
The current procedures for appointment to statutory bodies are set out in a Cabinet Office 
Circular, and contain a number of provisions designed to ensure appointment on merit. 
However, the procedures have no statutory backing, and there are no specific 
transparency requirements – as there are, for instance, in the United Kingdom, where the 
independent Commissioner for Public Appointments has an oversight and audit role.  
Given the size of the assets and funding under the control of statutory bodies in New 
Zealand, and the importance of having technically competent as well as representative 
boards, consideration should be given to strengthening the procedures requiring 
appointment on merit. For example, the appointment procedures in the Cabinet Office 
Circular could be codified at an appropriately general level in law.  Ministers would certify 
as now that all the requirements have been met with respect to a particular appointment, 
but specific responsibility could be allocated for auditing and reporting to Parliament on 
compliance with the procedures.  
5.6  The Role of Local Government 
An obvious issue in considering the quality of governance in New Zealand is whether the 
allocation of roles and responsibilities between central and sub-national government is the 
most effective and efficient. 
From a public finance perspective, the fundamental design problem in the vertical 
structure of government can be described as follows: efficiency of revenue collection 




In many countries, this conundrum is resolved through complex sharing of revenue bases 
and expenditure responsibilities, and through extensive revenue transfers from central to 
sub-national government. While addressing the revenue/expenditure mismatch, these 
approaches greatly increase complexity, and often result in blurred accountability. 
In New Zealand a virtue of current arrangements is the relatively clear separation between 
central and sub-national roles and responsibilities. With one or two exceptions such as 
roading, local governments raise their revenues from their own dedicated tax base, and 
expenditure responsibilities are clearly allocated to either central or sub-national levels. 
Key questions that the current arrangements raise, however, are: 
•  Is Government in New Zealand too centralized?; 
                                                                 
58 There are areas of spending that should obviously be the responsibility of central government, including 
defence, foreign affairs, and income redistribution. But information advantages at lower levels, and local 
diversity, suggest a presumption in favour of decentralization in many areas.   
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•  What are the relative benefits and costs of decentralization versus devolution? 
Decentralization involves delegating decision-making powers within central 
government agencies to managers in local offices, for example, the Regional 
Employment Commissioners in the Ministry of Social Development. Devolution 
involves the transfer of decision-making powers, for instance, to sub-national 
government, as occurred under the Resource Management Act, or to locally 
elected Boards, as occurred under the Tomorrow’s Schools initiative; 
•  What are the implications of devolution for the funding base of sub-national 
government? What are the implications if decision-making is devolved, but most 
funding is still held centrally, as in school governance?;  
•  Under a decentralization approach, what are the different ways in which local 
community views can be brought to bear in the decisions of central government 
agencies? One example is the Local Management Group structure set up under 
the Strengthening Families initiative, which brings together representatives of 
central government agencies, local government, and the non-government sector in 
discussions about local needs and service priorities for children at risk. Another 
example is the role of locally-elected District Health Boards in the health sector. 
One implication of the above is that questions concerning the powers of local government, 
its funding base, and its accountability are closely connected and should be considered 
together.  
Secondly, it would be highly desirable, should any fundamental changes in the powers, 
accountability and funding of local government in New Zealand be considered in future, 
for these to be informed by some in-depth comparative review of recent experiences in 
New Zealand with devolution and decentralization. An investigation of experience with the 
Resource Management Act (devolution), the current framework for roading (overlapping 
roles and mixed funding), and the Regional Employment Commissioners and 
Strengthening Families initiatives (decentralization) could highlight interesting features of 
these very different approaches, and provide important insights for policy. This could 
usefully be combined with some careful assessment of arrangements in selected relevant 
countries (including the variation across Australian States in the extent to which 
responsibilities are devolved below State level). 
5.7  The Role of Government in New Zealand in Fostering 
the Evolution of Social Norms 
As noted in Section 3 above, the role of government in fostering the evolution of social 
norms is controversial. Against this background, avenues tentatively suggested in this 
paper for further investigation in New Zealand are the content of the education curriculum; 
exploring ways to reduce the current polarization of views across different groups in New 
Zealand on issues relating to Maori rights and the Treaty; and the design of the legal 
framework regulating family relationships.  
One mechanism the government has to directly influence the formation of social norms 
and values is through the key role it plays in education as a regulator, funder and provider. 
Government can influence both how the curriculum is delivered (e.g. developing the 
capacity for effective inter-personal cooperation and team work), and the content of the 
curriculum. Recognition of the value and unique position of Maori has for some time been 
part of the curriculum, as has respect for the variety of cultures that make up New Zealand 
society. The curriculum, through its practices and procedures, also aims to reinforce 
values of individual and collective responsibility that underpin New Zealand’s democratic  
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society. 
59
 It would be worth considering, however, whether an enhanced “civics” 
component, specifically covering the functioning of key democratic institutions and the 
core elements of New Zealand’s institutional heritage may also have a place.  
Beyond the longer term mechanism of the education curriculum, active consideration 
should be given to more immediate ways in which the government might act to try to 
reduce the current polarization of views in the community over “Maori rights” issues.  The 
resolution of historical Treaty claims, and clarifying the role of the Treaty in contemporary 
society are areas of central importance in New Zealand. As noted in Section 4, the New 
Zealand Survey of Values has revealed deep divisions of view in New Zealand on these 
issues, and Webster has illustrated how these divisions are closely correlated with self-
reported ethnic identity.  
The Treaty settlements process is both an important opportunity to build social cohesion 
and, if mishandled, a risk of exacerbating existing social tensions or creating new social 
divisions. Given the current conjuncture, however, it is not an issue that can be avoided. 
Exploration of ways in which the current polarization of views might be reduced should, 
therefore, be seen as an area of strategic importance. Relevant issues here are the 
“framing” of the issues by the government, the pace and time-frame of the settlements 
process, and the quality of governance of iwi organisations receivingTreaty settlement 
assets. 
Perhaps the most important social institution in the formation of social norms and values is 
the family. In addition to its critically important roles in physical and emotional nurturing 
and human capital formation, it is one of the main means through which values and social 
norms are transmitted and maintained.  
The importance of the family for the functioning of society is widely acknowledged in public 
discourse in New Zealand. However, relatively little emphasis appears to have been given 
to analysis of the potential effects on family functioning - including the acquisition of 
instrumentally important social norms - of different legal frameworks for the regulation of 
family formation and dissolution. Recent debates on the law regulating de facto and legal 
marriages appear to have focused on the rights of the adults, with less attention to the 
possible effects of different legal rules on other outcomes of interest. 
Such outcomes include the life chances of children of separated partners. Family law (and 
other interventions such as the social welfare system) can have unintended   
 
                                                                 
59 Source: The New Zealand Curriculum Framework, Ministry of Education, Wellington.  
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consequences for the well-being both of adults and their children. 
60
 Further investigation 
of family law in New Zealand from both a rights-based and an outcomes-based 
perspective is warranted. 
6 Conclusions   
The governance and functioning of public institutions have major impacts on the well-
being of New Zealanders, both directly through opportunities for democratic participation 
and the protection of important individual freedoms, and indirectly through their impact on 
the functioning of society and on economic growth.  While New Zealand enjoys a good 
reputation internationally for the quality of governance of its public institutions, there are a 
number of factors that suggest further strengthening of transparency, accountability and 
integrity of public institutions in selected areas should be seriously considered.  
Areas for particular attention include greater accountability for the outcomes of 
government activity in the areas of spending and taxation; initiatives to strengthen ethics 
in Parliament, the judiciary and the public service; additional transparency in the process 
for public appointments; and additional transparency in regulation. Further exploratory 
work is also suggested on the adequacy of resourcing of Parliament, and the role of sub-
national governments.  
There is growing recognition internationally that the effective functioning of society, politics 
and the economy depend on the operation of informal social norms that facilitate social 
and economic exchange, promote social cohesion, and support the functioning of formal 
institutions. In a multicultural society, a core role of government is to recognise the 
existence of alternative “norm communities” and to preserve the autonomy of different 
groups in society to organise and conduct their activities according to their preferred 
norms (within the rule of law). In addition to such protections as anti-discrimination laws, 
this suggests the importance of ensuring that an effective enabling environment is in place 
for the operation of civil society organisations. In New Zealand priority attention should be 
given to the legal framework governing the establishment and operation of Maori 
collective organisations. This paper has also suggested the importance for Maori 
development of the evolution underway in norms of iwi governance, and that there might 
be a role for government to play in disseminating emerging best practice models. 
While recognizing and respecting diversity of norms and values, there is, nevertheless, a 
need for some overarching norms that guide the functioning of institutions at the national 
level. This paper has argued that the norms of democracy, individual rights, tolerance of 
diversity, and the rule of law should constitute such core norms in New Zealand, for 
reasons of the widespread recognition amongst New Zealanders of their intrinsic 
contribution to well-being, and the strength of the evidence of their critical importance for 
sustained increases in quality of life and standards of living.   
While norms of democracy enjoy solid support amongst New Zealanders, evidence 
suggests there is considerable variation in support across different sub-groups, and a 
possible fragility in the strength of commitment to them over time, especially when they 
are perceived as conflicting with other strongly held norms. While there are acknowledged 
risks associated with government action in this area, there would be merit in further 
exploring certain aspects of the potential role of government in fostering the evolution of 
                                                                 
60 For instance, there is international research on the effects of different divorce laws on the long run well-
being of children. See for example Gruber (2000), who compares the adult circumstances of children who 
grew up in US states where unilateral divorce was available versus children who grew up in states where it 
was not available. He highlights two channels through which making divorce easier can affect child outcomes: 
by increasing the odds that a child grows up in a divorced household; and by changing the “bargaining power” 
between spouses.  
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positive social norms. For instance, beyond the advocacy role of institutions such as the 
Human Rights Commission, an enhanced “civics” component in the education curriculum 
specifically covering the functioning of key democratic institutions and core elements of 
New Zealand’s institutional heritage should be considered.  
The deep divisions of view amongst New Zealanders on Treaty issues, and the correlation 
of those divisions with self-reported ethnic identity, suggest that government should also 
explore more immediate ways in which the current polarisation of the community on Treaty 
settlements and the contemporary role of the Treaty might be reduced. This is both a big 
opportunity, and, if mishandled, a big risk, but it is not an issue that can be avoided.  
The division of views on Treaty issues seems likely to reflect, in part, the presence of 
competing norms within New Zealand on appropriate governance models. There is a need 
to think through in more depth the evolving patterns of interaction between different sets of 
norms in New Zealand, and to consider how best to manage tensions that arise when 
norms conflict. Particular pressure points are apparent where the norms of democratic 
accountability at the national level come up against Maori desire for greater autonomy and 
different norms of governance – which are themselves evolving to reflect both tikanga and 
mainstream democratic practice. An important strategic issue in the Treaty area is 
whether, in requiring that Treaty settlement assets be transferred to accountable asset 
management structures, government has the balance right between a permissive 
approach, with very general governance requirements of iwi, and a more prescriptive 
approach. 
Initiatives to strengthen the governance of a range of public institutions, and to explore 
possible ways in which the government may foster the evolution of positive social norms 
and manage norm conflicts, are issues that are seldom the subject of focused attention in 
public policy in New Zealand. They should be seen as an important component of a mixed 
strategy to create a more inclusive economy and society, and in safeguarding and raising 
the well-being of New Zealanders over time.   
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